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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

)
)

DONALD CARLTON SHAMBLIN,

Case No. 87-0406-CA

)

Defendant and Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW:
I.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, §78-2a-3 (2) (c) (Repl Vol. 9, 1987 ed.) and
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
II.

NATURE AND PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal following a jury verdict in Washington County
Ninth Circuit Court Criminal Case No. 872001526 finding Defendant
guilty of Count I, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B
Misdemeanor, and Court II, Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
Class B Misdemeanor.
At the trial of this matter, held August 28, 1987, evidence was
introduced which had been obtained in a search of the vehicle the

M25/1

Appellant

was

driving

immediately

prior

to

his

arrest.

Tha

evidence was received over Appellant's objection that the search c
the vehicle and seizure of the evidence violated his rights agains
unreasonable search and seizure as protected by the Fourth Amendmen
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of th
Utah State Constitution.

A Motion to Suppress had been filed on o

about the 31st day of July, 1987.

The matter was heard on the 18t

of August, 1987, and then the balance of the hearing was continue
until Thursday, August 27, 1987.

Following the presentation o

evidence and argument at the Suppression Hearing, the Trial Cour
denied the Motion to Suppress.
After trial, Defendant waived time prior to sentencing and wa
sentenced at that time.

The Notice of Appeal was filed Septembe

15, 1987, with an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause
That application was denied by the Circuit Court on September 16
1987, without hearing.

On the 10th day of October, 1987, Appellan

filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause with th
Court of Appeals.

That application was granted.
III.

1*

Whether

ISSUES PRESENTFD FOR REVIEW

an

following an arrest

inventory

search

of

for driving under the

Appellant's

vehicl

influence of alcoho

violated Appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizur
as

guaranteed

by

the

Fourth

Amendment

to

the

United

State

Constitution where the law enforcement agency with which the office
was employed had no standardized departmental policy or procedur
concerning the manner of conducting an inventory search; the manner

-2-

of conducting the inventory search, including the decision whether
or

not

to

open

closed

containers, was

left

entirely

to

the

discretion of the officer conducting the inventory search.
2.

Whether

an

inventory

search

of

Appellant's

vehicle

following an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol
violated Appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure
as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution
where the law enforcement agency with which the officer was employed
had no standardized departmental policy or procedure concerning the
manner of conducting the inventory search; the manner of conducting
the

inventory

search, including

containers, was left entirely

whether

or not to open closed

to the discretion of the officer

conducting the inventory search*
3.

Whether

Article

I,

Section

14

of

the

Utah

State

Constitution requires that the law enforcement officer conducting an
inventory search of an impounded vehicle allow the owner of the
vehicle an opportunity to secure valuables located in the vehicle
before conducting the inventory search and whether the scope of a
reasonable

inventory

search of an impounded vehicle pursuant to

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is exceeded if
the officer conducting the search opens closed containers located in
the vehicle where the officer has no articulable reason to believe
that the closed container contains anything that is either dangerous
or evidence of illegal conduct.
4.

Should

the

State

have

been

permitted

to

introduce

statements made by Appellant, at the time of his arrest, concerning

-3-

the amount of an alcoholic beverage he had consumed when withou
presenting evidence relating that specific amount of alcohol to th<
issues before the jury.
5.

Should a witness acknowledged by the Court as an expert ii

the chemical analysis of marijuana be permitted to testify, in th<
form of an opinion, that the odor emitted from a "pipe" is that o
burnt marijuana where the only evidence concerning that witness1!
qualifications

to

acknowledgement

render

that

he

such
was

an

opinion

familiar

was

with

his

the

unexplaine<

odor

of

burrr

marijuana.
6.

Whether the Trial Courtfs instruction to the jury regarding

the term "reasonable doubt" denied Appellant a fair trial.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution
Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution
U.C.A. §76-1-501(1)
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Defendant guilt]
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor
and possession of a controlled
Misdemeanor.

substance, marijuana, a Class ]

The facts relevant to the issues presented for review

are:

-4-

On April 15, 1987, Appellant was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol (Transcript of Trial at 18) .

Trooper James D.

Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol observed a North American Van Line
truck traveling North on I 15 drive past the Port of Entry without
stopping. (Transcript of Trial at 19) .

Trooper Lloyd pursued the

vehicle and it stopped at mile post 3, approximately two miles North
of the Port of Entry

(Transcript of Trial at 20) •

Trooper Lloyd

did not notice anything unusual about the vehicle's driving pattern,
although Trooper Lloyd had the vehicle continually in his sight from
the Port of Entry until the vehicle stopped (2 miles) (Transcript of
Trial

at

48

and

49) . Trooper

Lloyd

spoke

with

Appellant

and

instructed him to return to the Port of Entry via the Bloomington
exit.

During that conversation, Appellant remained in the truck and

Trooper Lloyd stood on the ground beside the driverfs door, 3-4 feet
away from Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 31) .

Trooper Lloyd did

not detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage at that time and
Appellant's

speech

was

"good."

(Transcript

of

Trial

at 49).

Appellant drove past the Bloomington Exit, located about 3/4 mile
North of where the initial stop occurred.

After Appellant missed

that exit, Trooper Lloyd pursued the vehicle and stopped it at
approximately

mile post

6.

At

that

time, Trooper

Lloyd

asked

Appellant to get out of the vehicle and, as he did so, the officer
detected an odor of alcohol from Appellant's breath (Transcript of
Trial at 21 and 22) .

Field Sobriety tests were performed and,

-5-

according to the officer's testimony, Appellant failed three of th<
five (Transcript of Trial at 23-25).

Following completion of th<

Field Sobriety tests, Trooper Lloyd placed Appellant under arres^
for driving under the influence

(Transcript of trial at 23-25)

Appellant was identified at trial as the driver of the vehicl<
(Transcript of Trial at 25).
After Appellant was transported to the jail, an intoxilyze:
test was administered to Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 28). Th<
results of that test were admitted at trial over defense counsel1!
objection (Transcript of Trial at 34) .

The written report of th<

intoxilyzer test result was admitted into evidence as Plaintiff1!
Exhibit 2.

That report indicated a blood alcohol content of .1:

(Record at 74).
Officer Lloyd interviewed the Defendant after the intoxilyze:
test (Transcript of Trial at 35-36) .
how much he had been drinking.

The officer asked Appellan-

Over defense counsel's objectio:

based on relevance and the prejudicial impact of the testimony
Officer Lloyd was permitted to testify that Appellant told him h<
had consumed a "six-pack" of beer (Transcript of Trial at 3 8).
Trooper Lloyd performed a search of the immediate cab area o
the vehicle at the time of the arrest (Transcript of trial at 39)
After Appellant was transported to the County Jail, Trooper Lloy<
returned and started the inventory at about 10:08 p.m. (Transcrip*
of Trial at 39) .

While Trooper Lloyd was away from the vehicle

Deputy Sheriff Reg Browne remained with the vehicle.

-6-

He was there

when Trooper Lloyd returned (Transcript of Trial at 40) . However,
Trooper Lloyd did not know (1) whether Officer Brown had ever gone
into the cab while Trooper Lloyd was away, or (2) if he had left the
area of the cab for enough of a period of time that would have
allowed someone else to get into the vehicle (Transcript of trial at
46-47). Trooper Lloyd was away from the vehicle for over 26 minutes
(See Record at 75, intoxilyzer

checklist, and Transcript of Trial

at 39).
Prior to doing the inventory search of the interior of the
vehicle Appellant was driving, Trooper Lloyd determined that there
were no other

individuals

in the vehicle other than Appellant

(Transcript of trial at 40)•
Before beginning the inventory

search, Trooper Lloyd asked

Appellant if he had any cash, jewelry, gold or anything of excess
value in the vehicle. Appellant replied that he did not (Transcript
of August 18, 1987, hearing, at 6, 7). However, Trooper Lloyd did
not ask Appellant what his desires were with reference to securing
any property in the vehicle prior to conducting the inventory search
(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 16). Trooper Lloyd used
a standard inventory form for conducting the inventory.
form he noted some of the contents of the vehicle.

On that

A copy of the

inventory sheet was admitted as Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 at the
August 18, 1987, hearing (See Record at 62). During the inventory
search Trooper Lloyd

found a small red bag containing what he

identified as a pipe, a bong and a plastic bag containing a green
leafy substance (Transcript of trial at 41, 42). The red bag was
"zippered"

(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 9).

The

officer testified that he believed that the bag in which the red
-7-

zippered bag was located was zippered shut as well (Transcript of
August 18, 1987, hearing at 20).

That bag was located in the

sleeper compartment of the cab behind the driver's seat (Transcript
of trial at 41) .
It is the departmental policy of the Utah State Highway Patrol
to conduct an inventory search of vehicles to be impounded for
D.U.I.!s by that agency, according to testimony presented by Trooper
Lloyd.

The policy provides that:

When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound
lot or to any commercial storage lot, a written inventory
shall be made of the contents of the vehicle. Such record
shall become a part of the case file. When custody of the
vehicle changes from one person to another, the person
taking custody of the vehicle shall also assume custody of
the contents by placing his signature on the inventory
list. (See Defendant's Exhibit 1 introduced at the
Suppression Hearing, Record at 55-56)
Trooper Lloyd was aware of no other written guidelines or directive!
expressing a departmental policy concerning the inventory search o
impounded vehicles (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing, at 15).
An unwritten policy of the Utah State Highway Patrol, accordin
to Trooper Lloyd, was to allow a person "responsible for the vehicl
[who is] immediately available [to] come and take possession of th
vehicle."

If there were no persons responsible for the vehicle

then the vehicle would be impounded (Transcript of August 18, 1987
hearing at 6). The Officers1 practice, in inventorying items in a
impounded

vehicle,

although

not

specifically

established

I

departmental policy, was only to list those items of "'excess value,
There was no departmental policy that outlined whether or not itei
of non-excess value should be left out of the inventory list. Th<

-8-

decision was left to the discretion of the officer conducting the
inventory search (Transcript of hearing of August 18, 1987, at 9,
10) .
At the time of this inventory search there was no written Utah
Highway Patrol departmental policy specifying when the inventory
search was to be conducted after the vehicle was seized (Transcript
of August 18, 1987, hearing at 15).

Trooper Lloyd's normal practice

was to conduct the inventory search before the vehicle was delivered
to the impound yard (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 16).
While Trooper Lloyd

listed the contents of some containers

located in the vehicle, contents of some of the containers were not
separately examined or listed.

The contents of a blue suitcase were

listed as "clothes" (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 20).
Trooper Lloyd did not inventory the contents of a black tool kit
(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 22).

Trooper Lloyd's

decision whether or not to inventory specific items located within
the vehicle was not based on any standardized departmental policy or
procedure but was based on his own personal policy when he did an
inventory

search.

There was no standardized departmental policy

specifying whether or not a zippered container should be inventoried
as a container or should be opened and the contents separately
inventoried.

That decision was left entirely to the discretion of

the officer conducting the inventory (Transcript of August 18, 1987,
hearing at 23)
The Appellant never gave permission to Trooper Lloyd to search
the vehicle (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 24). There
was nothing about the arrest that led Trooper Lloyd to believe that

-9-

there were any controlled

substances

located within the vehicl

(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 24). All items obtaine
during the inventory search were returned to the Appellant with th
exception of the evidence
August

27,

1987,

hearing

seized by the officer
at

12

(The

(Transcript o

Transcript,

incorrectl

identifying the date of that hearing as August 19, 1987, is found i
the Record at page 136)).
The green leafy substance found by Trooper Lloyd was identifie
by witness Dennis Rogers as marijuana (Transcript of Trial at 81)
Mr. Rogers indicated that a bong is commonly used to smoke marijuan
and that the pipe found by Trooper Lloyd would be used for the sam
purpose

(Transcript of trial at 82).

Mr. Rogers testified, ove

defense counsel's objection, that the odor emanating from the pip
was that of burnt marijuana (Transcript of trial at 83). Mr. Roger
testified

that

the odor emanating

from the

"bong11, Plaintiff

Exhibit No. 7, was also that of burnt marijuana (Transcript of tria
at 84).
No testimony was presented at trial to establish Mr. Roger1
qualifications to testify concerning the odor of marijuana excep
his acknowledgement that he was familiar with the smell of burn
marijuana (Transcript of trial at 82).
Appellant did not testify.
After evidence had been presented at trial the court instructe
the jury.

The Court instructed the Jury, over defense counsel1

objection, on the issue of reasonable doubt as follows:
Before you give up your presumption that the Defendant is
innocent, you must make sure you are strongly convinced
that he did the acts he is accused of, and that you do not
have a reasonable doubt about it.
-10-

A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would stop a
person with common sense from making an important decision
in his or her own life.
Notice when I say you should be strongly convinced and net
have a reasonable doubt, I am not saying you have to be
100% certain. Use your common sense about this. Nothing
in life is absolutely certain.
However, this doesn't
stop us from making important decisions in our own lives.
All we can ask of you is to be as certain as you would
want to be if you were making an important decision in
your own life (Record at 85).
The

Defendant

had

submitted

instruction on reasonable doubt.

to

the

Court

the

following

The Court refused to give that

instruction.
By reasonable doubt is made a doubt based on reason, and
which is reasonable in view of all of the evidence; and
if, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you
are not satisfied of the Defendant's guilt, you have a
reasonable
doubt;
but
if,
after
such
impartial
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can
truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the
Defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act
upon in more weighty and important matters relating to
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. It must
be a real, substantial doubt, and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary.
It should come to the mind
spontaneously,
and
should
fairly,
naturally,
and
reasonably arise out of the evidence as given in the case
(Record at 37) .
Following the presentation of evidence, closing arguments by
counsel and the final instructions by the Court the Jury retired to
deliberate and returned with a verdict of guilty on both counts of
the information:

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B

Misdemeanor and Possession of Marijuana, a Class B Misdemeanor.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that inventory
impounded

automobiles

are

searches

-11-

for

searches of

constitutional

purposes

which are not per se unreasonable if conducted within appropriat*
limitations.

However/ one of the elements to be considered i]

determining whether or not the inventory search was conducted withi]
appropriate

limitations

departmental

policies

enforcement

agency

is

and

to

determine

procedures

conducting

the

were

whether

standardize<

followed

by

inventory

search.

the
In

la)
thii

instance there were no departmental policies with reference to th<
inventory.

The

manner

of

conducting

the

inventory,

includin<

whether or not to open closed containers, was left entirely to th<
discretion of the police officer.

That practice was specifically

disapproved by the U.S. Supreme Court.
departmental

policy

concerning

the

In light of the lack o

manner

of

conducting

tin

inventory, the evidence obtained in the inventory search should hav<
been suppressed as the result of a per se unreasonable search am
seizure.
There

is no

specific

guideline

in the State of Utah wit]

reference to application of Article I Section 14 to an automobil<
inventory search, but even if the federal standard were held t<
apply

to

the

unreasonable.

State

Constitution,

this

inventory

search

wa.

However, this Court's decisions interpreting Article

I, Section 14 of the State Constitution have specificaLly recognize<
the

individual's

right

of

privacy.

When

balanced

against th<

legitimate state interest justifying inventory searches, that righ
of privacy mandates that the individual be afforded the opportunit;
to secure his own property and requires that an inventory search b<

-12-

limited

in

inventory?

scope
the

to

accomplish

search

should

the
not

legitimate
be

purposes

expanded

to

of

an

authorize

unnecessary intrusions into the individual's expectation of privacy
with reference to closed, sealed, locked or zippered containers.
The Trial Court's permitting testimony regarding the amount of
alcohol the Appellant claimed to have consumed at the time of his
arrest

without

requiring

some

additional

testimony

so

as

to

establish the relevance of that testimony was unduly prejudicial to
the Appellant.

Certainly the prosecution may introduce voluntary

statements made by an accused at the time of his arrest which are
preceded by Miranda warnings.

In this case, statements made by

Appellant that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage were certainly
relevant. However/ nothing is added to the establishment of facts
material to a determination of the issues presented if statements
concerning a specific quantity of alcohol consumed are introduced
unless there is testimony offered by the State relating the quantity
consumed to the issues before the jury i.e. blood alcohol content or
ability to safely drive.
evidence
amount

that would
consumed

to

The State should be required to present

relate
those

the

statement

issues

as

a

concerning

a specific

prerequisite

to

the

admissibility of that statement.
A witness's statement that he was familiar with the odor of
burnt marijuana should not be sufficient foundation to permit the
witness to testify as to his opinion regarding the odor emanating
from a specific exhibit introduced at trial.

In this case, Dennis

Rogers was not qualified as an expert in the detecting of the odor
of marijuana and no foundation was offered for hie testimony on that
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issue as a lay witness.

Without further foundation, Mr. Roger

should not have been permitted to offer that opinion.
In this instance the Trial Court instructed
reference

to

the

issue

of

reasonable

doubt.

the Jury wit

That

misstated the standard of proof in a criminal case.

instructio

The instructio

very conceivably could lead a jury to believe that they need not b
100%

certain

that

established.

proof

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

had

bee

The instruction reduced the threshold of proof tha

must be presented in a criminal case, denying Appellant's rights t
due process of law.
The evidence obtained as a result of the inventory search o
the vehicle Appellant was driving should have been suppressed an
Appellant's
reversed.
and

pipe

consumed

conviction

for

possession

of

marijuana

should

b

The testimony concerning the perceived odor of the bon
and

the

unduly

instructions

to

amount

of

alcohol

Appellant

prejudiced

the Appellant,

the

Court

Trial

upon

claimed

requiring

remand

for

to hav

appropriat

a

new

trial

Finally, the instruction en reasonable doubt denied Appellant a fai
trial mandating that this case be remanded for a trial consisten
with due process.
VII.

ARGUMENT

A. THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS PER S
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S
CONSTITUTION, SINCE THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE SEARCH WAS NO
PURSUANT TO STANDARDIZED DEPARTMENTAL PROCEDURE BUT WAS LEF
ENTIRELY TO THE DISCRETION OF THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE SEARCH.
An inventory of an impounded automobile by
officers is a search.

law enforcemen

(See Colorado v. Bertinc, 479 U.S.

L. Ed. 2d. 739, 107 S. Ct.

(1987)).

, 93

Whether the inventor

search is reasonable, as required by the Fourth Amendment to th
-14-

United States Constitution, depends on a number of factors:

(1)

the vehicle must be impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody§
(See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96
S. Ct, 3092 (1976)); (2)

the inventory search cannot be a pretext

for an investigative search (See South Dakota v. Opperman); (3)

the

inventory must be conducted according to standardized criteria, (See
Bertine 93 L. Ed. 2d. at 747, note 6); and
criteria must not vest

the police

(4) the standardized

officers with

discretion

to

determine the scope of the inventory search (See Bertine 93 L. Ed.
2d. at 748, concurring opinion).
met,

the

reasonable.

Supreme

Court

has

As long as these conditions are

held

an

inventory

search

to

be

The reverse is also implicit in the holdings —

if

these standards are not met, the inventory search is unreasonable.
In Bertine, at page 747, in a footnote to the majority opinion
written by Justice Rehnguist, the nature of the departmental policy
which is required is discussed:
We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court
found that the police department's procedures mandated the
opening of closed containers and the listing of their
contents.
Our decisions have always adhered to the
requirement that inventories be conducted according to
standardized criteria. See Lafayette, 462 U.S., at 648,
77 L. Ed. 2d. 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605; Opperman, 428 U.S., at
374-375, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092.
In a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice Powell and
Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun also emphasizes the need for
standard procedures to avoid the possibility of discretionary action
by the searching officer.
The Court today holds that police officers may open
closed containers while conducting a routine inventory
search of an impounded vehicle.
I join the Court's
opinion, but write separately to underscore the importance
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of having such inventories conducted only pursuant to
standardized police procedures. The underlying rationale
for allowing an inventory exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant rule is that police officers are not
vested with discretion to determine the scope of the
inventory search. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US
364, 382-383, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring).
This absence of discretion
ensures that inventory searches will not be used as a
purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of
crime. Thus, it is permissible for police officers to
open closed containers in an inventory search only if they
are following standard police procedures that mandate the
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle.
Id. at 748, 749.
Again, in Bertine at 749 and 750, the same point is emphasize
in the dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan:
In assessing the reasonableness of searches conducted in
limited situations such as these, where we do not require
probable cause or a warrant, we have consistently
emphasized
the
need
for
such
set
procedures:
"standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted
that the discretion of the official in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent."
Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 US 648, 661, 59 L. Ed. 2d. 6760, 99 S. Ct.
1392 (1979). See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 US
266, 270, 37 L. Ed. 2d. 596, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 433, 37 L. Ed. 2d. 706, 93 S.
Ct. 2523 (1973); Harris v. United States, 390 US 234, 235,
19 L. Ed. 2d. 1067, 88 S. Ct. 992 (1968); Camara v
Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 532-533, 18 L. Ed. 2d. 930,
87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967) .
The

existence

of

a written, detailed

standardized

departmenta

policy regarding the procedures to be followed in conducting a
inventory search of an impounded vehicle is basic to the standard
for reasonableness which have evolved in the cases.
which

the

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

an

In each case i

inventory

search i

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, th
existence of a standardized departmental policy is discussed.
holdings presume the existence of such a policy
conclusions thereon.
-16-

Tb

and base thei

Without a standardized departmental policy, two and probably
three of the four standards listed above are not met.

1)

The law

enforcement department does not have an established procedure and
form

for

conducting

an

inventory

search;

2)

no

procedure was followed because none existed; and 3)

established

the inventory

search may very likely be a mere pretext for an investigative search
because its scope is discretionary with the impounding officer.

If

the inventory is a mere pretext for an evidentiary search, then it
clearly

is

not

allowed

under

either

the

state

or

federal

constitutions .
In Bertinef the Supreme Court upheld the search of a closed
backpack

which

was

found

warrantless inventory search.

in

an

impounded

vehicle

during

a

In doing so, the Court held that if

the police were following a standardized procedure and had not acted
in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation; the search
did not violate the fourth amendment of the federal constitution.
However, in the case before the Court, the requirements for a
reasonable inventory search were not met in two major respects:

(1)

The local Utah Highway Patrol had no stated or defined procedures
which they were to follow in conducting an inventory search.
policy manual

The

(General Order No. 83-10, rev. Jan. 1986) merely

states that when a vehicle is impounded, "a written inventory shall
be made of the contents of the vehicle."

A form is provided, but

there are no instructions regarding closed containers found in the
vehicle.

An officer

is left totally

to his own discretion to

selectively determine how thorough his search should be.
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(2)

The

officer's

search has the appearance

rather than an inventory

search.

of

an

investigative

The inventory

lists

searc

items i

selective detail, itemizing alleged contraband, but not specifyin
other individual items of value located in the vehicle.

If th

search had been truly an inventory search, valuable items would hav
received primary

focus, and the officer would not have had th

option of listing some things in detail and omitting other items
The contents of the "tool box" would have been the subject of
detailed inventory and would not have been inventoried as a tool be
without inventorying the contents.
Because

the

standards

for reasonableness

set

forth by th

Supreme Court were not met in the instant case, the search was pe
se unreasonable.

A standardized departmental procedure is required

In Appellant's case, the extent of the inventory search was totall
subject to the searching officer's discretion in the absence of
standardized departmental policy defining piocedures to be followe
in performing the inventory search.
has emphasized

that vesting

The Untied States Supreme Cour

the officer with the discretion t

determine the scope of the inventory search must be avoided if sue
a search is to be reasonable.

The evidence seized in this case mus

be suppressed as the fruit of an unreasonable search, in violatic
of Appellant's Constitutional rights as protected by the Fourt
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
B. THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS PER S
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY I
PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIC
WHERE HE WAS NOT OFFERED THE ALTERNATIVE OF SECURING HIS PROPERTY I
HIMSELF AND THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE NECESSAI
TO ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSES OF A LEGITIMATE INVENTORY SEARCH.
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Article If Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution protects
against unreasonable search and seizure as an improper invasion of
privacy.

The

language

of

that

Constitutional

provision

is

essentially the same as the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

In light of the similarity in the language of the

State and Federal Constitution, as they
search and seizure, the Utah standard
inventory

search

should

be

at

relate

to unreasonable

for reasonableness of an

least

as

protective

of

the

individual's right of privacy as is the Federal Constitution. (See
Section A, above).

However, this State's interest in protecting the

right of privacy of its citizens requires that the person whose
vehicle is to be searched be given an opportunity to make his own
arrangements to secure property located in the vehicle and the scope
of

the

inventory

search

should

be

limited

to

listing

closed

containers, in which a greater expectation of privacy exists, as
closed containers.
Assuming
warrantless

that the

inventory

impounding

of

the vehicle

is proper, a

search may be made of the vehicle if the

search meets the constitutional requirement of "reasonableness."
It is also well established that an inventory search
constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. A
v/arrantless search of an impounded vehicle for the
purposes of protecting the police and public from danger,
avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and
protecting the owner's property is permitted by the fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution.
Because inventories promote such important interests
and are not investigatory in purpose, they do not implicate
"the interests which are protected when searches are
conditioned on warrants." Therefore, inventory searches
are not per se unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14. Contraband or
other evidence of crime discovered in a true inventory
-19-

search may be seized without a warrant and introduced into
evidence at trial. State of Utah v. Hygh 711 P. 2d 264,
265 (Utah, 1985).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Criscola, 444 P. 2d 517, a
p. 51S, (Utah, 1968) states the reasonableness test as follows:
The essential thing is to keep within the reasonable
middle ground, between the protecting of the law-abiding
citizenry from high handed or officious intrusions into
their private affairs; and the imposing of undue
restrictions upon conscientious officers doing their duty
in the investigation of crime. It was undoubtedly in an
awareness of the desirability of avoiding the difficulty
just mentioned that the language of the Fourth Amendment
does not denounce all searches, but only those which are
!
'unreasonable.n Citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364; Cooper v. State of Calif., 386 U.S. 58; and Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160.
The Court, in the same case, defined the test of "reasonableness" a
follows:
The question to be answered is whether under the
circumstances the search or seizure is one which
fair-minded persons, knowing the facts, and giving due
consideration to the rights and interests of the public,
as well as to those of the suspect, would judge to be an
unreasonable or oppressive intrusion against the latter!s
rights. Ibid.
The majority of the courts considering the reasonableness of a
inventory search incident to the impounding of a vehicle have liste
certain standards which must be met.

Universally these standard

require that the vehicle be legally impounded, and the inventory no
be a pretext for an investigatory search.

Apparently recognizin

the difficulty inherent in determining whether an inventory is
pretext

for

investigation,

the

Courts

have

almost

universall

required that the manner of conducting the inventory be pursuant t
a standardized departmental procedure and not left to the officer1
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discretion.

Since even standardized departmental procedures can be

unconstitutional (See State v Jewell, 338 So. 2d. 633 (La 1976)) so
most

Courts

inventory

have

search

also
even

discussed
if there

the permissible
is a

scope of the

standardized

procedure for conducting the inventory search.

departmental

These cases which

have discussed the reasonableness of inventory searches require that
the

officer

conducting

the

search

adhere

to

the

standardized

procedure.
At the very least, this Court should require that the officer
conducting the inventory search adhere to a standardized procedure
which defines the scope of the inventory search.

However, this

Court should determine that, independent of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14, of the Utah
State Constitution protects against unreasonable inventory searches.
1.

The person having custody

of a vehicle prior to its

impoundment and the inventory search of its contents should be given
the opportunity to secure the contents contained in the vehicle as a
prerequisite to a reasonable inventory search.
This Court could adopt the Federal guidelines with reference to
inventory searches.

However, in light of the protection afforded

the individual's privacy rights by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
State

Constitution,

the

Utah

State

Constitution

interpreted independently from Federal guidelines.
other

states, whether

interpreting

their

own

should

be

Decisions from
or

the

Federal

Constitution, provide some guidance in reaching that independent
determination of reasonableness under our State Constitution.

-21-

Many
inventory
Federal

state

courts

searches.

addressed

the

reasonableness

of

Many of those cases were decided based on

Constitutional

specifically

have

decided

on

grounds.
a

However,

state's

specific

some

have

constitution

been
as it

protects its citizens right of privacy.
In the state of Montana, the Constitution specifically protects
the individual right of privacy.
that

State

has

held

that

Accordingly, the Supreme Court of

Fourth

Amendment

analysis

is

not

determinative and, in that State, inventory searches of impounded
vehicles are limited to articles in plain view from outside the
vehicle.

If the owner is present, he is the adequate judge of the

treatment of his property and his desires must be considered.

State

v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131 (Mont. 1977).
The Louisiana State Constitution prohibits unreasonable search
and seizure and invasion of privacy.
State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d. 633

The Louisiana Supreme Court, ir

(LA 1976), after discussing the

Federal standard concerning reasonableness of inventory searches,
concluded that a necessary prerequisite to a reasonable inventory
search in the State of Louisiana is the requirement that the law
enforcement agency conducting the search first allow the owner of
the vehicle an opportunity to secure his own property,.

That Court

acknowledged that standardized departmental policies and procedures
are essential to the reasonableness of an inventory search, but also
reasoned

that

"unconstitutional

searches

cannot

be

constitutionalized by standardizing them as part of normal police
practice." 338 So.2d. at 640.

See also State v. Pome, 354 So.2d.

504 (LA 1978).
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In

both

Montana

and

Louisiana,

the

State

Constitutions

specifically protect an individual's right of privacy.

Accordingly,

one might argue that the Constitution in those States goes beyond
the protection afforded by the Federal Constitution.

While that may

be true, the rational of the Supreme Court in each of those states
is consistent with prior decisions of this Court recognizing a
constitutionally protected right of privacy in the State of Utah.
While

many

decisions

of

this

Court

have

determined

that

the

individuals right of privacy was not violated by a given search,
this Court has consistently recognized that the individual in the
State of Utah has a constitutionally protected right of privacy.)
See,

for example, State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d. 1259

(Utah 1972);

State v. Schreve, 667 P.2d. 590 (Utah 1983).
While the states of Montana and Louisiana have Constitutions
which specifically protect the right of privacy, other states have
Constitutions which are, for the most part, the same as Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution.

The decisions of those

states v/ith reference to the reasonableness of an inventory search
provide some valuable guidelines in assessing what standard this
Court should adopt with reference to the reasonableness of inventory
searches under
Trooper Lloydfs

the Utah

State Constitution

and whether

conduct in this case violated

or not

that standard of

reasonableness.
In

Oregon, the

Constitution

prohibits

any

law

that

would

violate the law of the people to be secure in their effects against
unreasonable search or seizure.

The Supreme Court of Oregon has

held that a policy of inventorying the contents of an impounded
vehicle is not inherently unreasonable if the prescribed procedures
-23-

comply with the following conditions:
"A.

The vehicle must be lawfully impounded . . . and

B. ...[the] inventory must be conducted pursuant to a
properly authorized administrative program, designed am
systematically administered so that the inventory involves n<
exercise of discretion by the law enforcement person directing
taking the inventory." State v. Atkinson, 688 P.2d. 832 a836-837 (OR 1984).
In State v. Mangold, 414 A.2d. 1312 (N.J. 1980), the Supreim
Court of the State of New Jersey determined that, in the absence o
a search warranty or indications of criminality, law enforcemen
officials must afford one an opportunity to remove possessions froi
an impounded vehicle before conducting an inventory of its contents
Absent consent or alternative security provisions, an inventory ma"
not be undertaken in that State; the vehicle owner is presumed t<
have assumed the risk for any claims of property loss or thef
arising

from

the

impoundment

if

the

search

is

not

permitted

Accordingly, the results of an inventory search in that case wen
suppressed although impoundment was proper and the inventory was i
accordance with standard police departmental procedure.

The Suprem

Court of Louisiana stated in that case:
If in fact the principal justifications for an inventory
are to protect the property and the vehicle and to shield
the authorities from false claims relating to those items,
it would seem only reasonable to consult with the owner or
temporary custodian of the vehicle when he is present at
the time of the search. Id. at 1317.
From
gleaned.

the

foregoing

cases,

The

over-riding

some

message

of

general
those

principles
cases

is

can b

that

th

inventory search should be conducted consistent with its purpose
The purpose of an inventory search as acknowledged by this Court i
State v. Johnson, 60 Utah at Reports 30
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(Utah, June 30, 1987)

decided under Federal Constitutional grounds, are to (1) protect an
owner's property while he is in the custody of the police; (2)
insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property; and
(3)

protect

reasonableness

police
standard

purposes, an inventory

officers

from

danger.

to the accomplishment

Applying

the

of each of those

search of an impounded vehicle must, in

addition to being conducted pursuant to standardized departmental
procedure specifying the manner in which the inventory search is to
be conducted, require that the officer allow the owner of the
vehicle to make alternative arrangements to secure the contents of
the vehicle.
If the purpose of the inventory is to protect the property of
the individual whose vehicle has been impounded, then clearly, that
individual should be afforded an opportunity to secure the property
himself.

As the Supreme Court did in the case of State v. Mangold,

this Court can and should determine that if the owner of the vehicle
does not consent to the search or make

arrangements

to secure

possessions in the impounded vehicle, he is presumed to have assumed
the risk for any claims of property loss or theft arising from the
impoundment.

This

Court's

specifying

such

a presumption

would

obviate the need for a detailed inventory search against the owner's
will in order to insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized
property.
2.

Closed containers should not be opened and the contents

separately
contents,

inventoried
if

left

absent

unexamined,

articulable
would
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create

suspicion
a

danger

that
to

the
those

impounding

the

container

or

that

the

contents

are evidence o

illegal conduct.
In State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d. 408 (Alaska 1979), the Alask,
Supreme Court acknowledged that Article I, Section 14 of the Alask.
Constitution contains an even broader guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures than is found in its Federal

counterpart

Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution protects the righ
of the people to be secure in their "other property" as well a
those items enumerated in the Fourth Amendment to the United State
Constitution.

Having concluded that the right of privacy guarantee

to Alaskan citizens is broader in scope than that guaranteed in th
Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court of Alaska went on to discus
whether

or

not

the

police,

as

a matter

of

routine

inventor

procedure, are entitled to search closed, locked or sealed luggage
containers, or packages contained within the vehicle whose content
are being inventoried.
"Protection
containers
fundamental

of
and

the

The Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that

interiors

packages

expectations

expectation of privacy

closed

transported
ot

recognize as reasonable."

of

privacy

luggage,

in

the

which

Id. at 416.

brief

vehicle

Alaska

cases
reflect

society

woul

Because of that greate

in closed containers, the Alaska Suprem

Court concluded that, "A warrantless inventory search of closed
locked or sealed luggage, containers or packages contained within
vehicle is unreasonable and thus an unconstitutional search unde
the Alaska Constitution."

Id. at 417-418.

In State v. McDougal, 228 N.W. 2d. 671 (Wis. 1975), the Suprem
Court of Wisconsin reasoned, without specifying whether they were
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addressing the issue under the Federal or the State Constitution,
that the object sought to be achieved by the inventory search, that
is, protection of the police from claims of theft and protection of
the Defendant's property, do not usually require an inspection of
closed suitcases and containers.

In State v. Prober, 297 N.W. 2d. 1

(Wis. 1980) , the Supreme Court of that State again cited both the
Federal and the State Constitutions without specifying under which
standard the case was decided.

In that particular case, the Court

determined that a purse in the trunk of the vehicle should not have
been opened and searched.

The Court stated that "the purpose of

inventory can be adequately served by inventorying a container as a
closed unit." Id. at 7.

The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin

has determined that, in balance, the greater expectation of privacy
in a closed or a sealed container found inside a vehicle justifies
inventorying that container as a closed container.
item as

such i.e.,

list a tool box

To inventory the

as a tool box, does not

significantly interfere with the government's need to protect itself
against claims for loss of property.
Some
inventory
standard.

cases

which

search

were

However, the

have

decided

clearly

based

rational

of

the
on

reasonableness
Federal

the Courts

of

an

Constitutional
in those

cases

merits consideration even in light of recent Federal cases which
might be considered contrary to those State Court decisions.

The

reasonableness of the rational in these cases is no less now than
before Opperman and Bertine.
The State of Washington in State v. Houser, 622 P.2d. 1218
(Washington 1980), concluded that, "An inventory search may not be
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unlimited in scope.
be

restricted

exceptions

The direction and extent of such searches mus

to effectuating

to

the

Fourth

the purposes which

Amendment."

622

justify

P.2d.

at

thei
1225

Accordingly, the inventory search should be "limited to protecting
against
enlarged
concluded
an

substantial
on

the

that

inventory

risks

basis

it was
search

of

to

property

remote

unnecessary
that

in

risks."

inventoried as a unit.

a

Court
locked

unlocking

the contents of the trunk was unreasonable.
discuss whether or not a closed

vehicle

The

to open

included

the

toiletry

and

and

no

therefore
trunk an<
examining

The Court went on t<
kit

should

have bee

While it is true that the Washington Suprem

Court's analysis of that issue predates Bertine and was based i
substantial part on prior U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting th
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, the balancing of interest
rational applied by the Washington Supreme Court is still a vali
approach to the issue.
concluded

that

the

In that case, the Washington Supreme Cour

balancing

of

the

governmental

and

societa

interests of an inventory search as previously recognized by tha
Court against the citizens1

interest in the privacy of persona

luggage requires that a closed piece of luggage not be opened an
searched unless "the police have reason to believe a container hold
instrumentalities which would be dangerous even when sitting idly i
the police locker." 622 P.2d. at 1228.

In those instances, th

police may, and should search the contents of the container.

Th

Washington Supreme Court cited with approval the case of People v
Counterman, 556 P.2d. 481 (Colorado 1976).
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That decision, based i

part on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado State Constitution concluded
that a knapsack which did not give any indication that its contents
were dangerous or particularly valuable and in need of special
inventory should not have been opened and the contents examined.
The legitimate purposes of the inventory search could have been
fully accomplished by merely noting the item as a sealed knapsack.
Id. at 485.
This

Court

should

determine

that

closed

containers

be

inventoried as closed containers in the absence of an articulated
suspicion

that the closed

container

contains

something

that is

dangerous or illegal.
In this case, the officer conducted a detailed inventory of
some packages
contents.

and

listed

other packages without

Obviously, Trooper

Lloyd was

specifying

not concerned

the

that the

purposes of the inventory search would not be fulfilled if he failed
to list the contents of the tool box.

Just as he need not list the

contents of the tool box, he need not have listed the contents of
the shaving satchel or the blue zippered bag in which the shaving
satchel was located.

There is simply no need to rifle through the

contents of closed containers

in order to perform an inventory

search, except as a pretext to search

for evidence, especially

where, as here, the owner denied that there was anything of "excess
value" located in the vehicle.

In this particular instance, the

Appellant was asked if he had any property of excess value.
stated that he did not.

He

In light of that statement, Trooper Lloyd's
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inventory search should not have gone beyond listing items in th
truck.

Closed containers should not have been opened and searched.

This Court should adopt, as a standard of reasonableness o
inventory search under the Utah State Constitution, the requiremen
that the officer

conducting

the search allow the owner of th

vehicle to take reasonable measures to secure his own property and
if any inventory search of the contents of a vehicle is undertaken
the scope should be limited
containers
through

as

the

such without
contents.

An

to inventorying
opening

the

individual's

and

listing close

containers
right

of

and

riflin

privacy

whe

balanced against the State"s interest in conducting an inventor
search might give way where containers are listed as such.
the right of privacy

in a zippered

shaving

satchel

However

located i

another zippered container is so obvious that, in the absence of a
articulated suspicion that the satchel contains evidence of a crim
or something that creates a danger if left unexamined, that privac
interest clearly outweighs the governmental interest in conductin
inventory searches.
C. APPELLANT'S ADMISSION TO HAVING CONSUMED A SPECIFIC AKOUN
OF AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED ABSENT COMPETEN
EVIDENCE RELATING THAT AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL TO THE APPELLANT'S ABILIT
TO SAFELY OPERATE A MOTOR VEHICLE OR HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT.
The Appellant's admission at the time of his arrest that he ha
consumed alcohol was clearly admissible in this case.
801, Utah Rules of Evidence.)

(See Rul

However, his statement concerning th

amount consumed, even though an admission, is not admissible withou
appropriate evidence to relate that amount consumed to the issue
before the trier of fact.

All evidence, even admissicns by parties
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should be balance against the standards established by Rules 401 and
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule

401 defines relevant

evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more

probable

evidence."

or

less

probable

than

it would

be

without

the

However, even relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . ."
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
In this particular instance, the issue is whether a witness's
statement as to the precise amount of the alcohol he had consumed
should be excluded

pursuant

to Rule

403 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence unless the party offering that statement introduces proof
to establish the relevance of the amount of alcohol claimed to have
been consumed.
In conjunction with competent expert testimony relating the
amount of alcohol claimed to have been consumed to the relevant
issues in a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol, the
3ury would not be unfairly prejudiced, confused ox misled if an
amount consumed is specified.

However, introducing the unqualified

statement that an individual had consumed a "six-pack" serves no
purpose, in the absence of evidence relating that amount of alcohol
to the issues before the Court.

Evidence that a "six-pack" was

consumed with nothing more is unduly prejudicial.
in this case

should have required
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the State

The Trial Court

to present expert

testimony relating the consumption of a "six-pack" of beer to bloc
alcohol content or ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
D. TESTIMONY THAT A WITNESS IS "FAMILIAR WITH THE ODOR 0
BURNED MARIJUANA" IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THA
WITNESS'S TESTIMONY THAT A SPECIFIC EXHIBIT HAS THE ODOR OF BURN
MARIJUANA.
In order for a witness to offer an opinion at trial, tha
individual must either have been qualified as an expert to render a
opinion on that issue (Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence) or, if h
cannot testify as an expert, the testimony must be "rationally base
on

the

perception

of

the

witness

and

helpful

to

a

clea

understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact i
issue."

(Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence).

Dennis Rogers was

qualified

In this instance

as an expert on the

chemical analysis of marijuana.

He was not qualified as an exper

on identifying the odor of burnt marijuana.
he was familiar with that odor.

issue of th

He merely stated tha

The prosecution did not present an

evidence as to how the officer obtained that familiarity nor did th
State lay any other foundation that would allow the judge to asses
the qualifications of that witness to so testily or allow the jur
to decide whether the opinion should be given any weight.

The Tria

Court completely glossed over the requirements of foundation fc
that type of an opinion and allowed the officer to testify with r
more qualification than that he was familiar with the odor of burr
marijuana.

In the event this matter is remanded for trial and tl"

evidence about which Dennis Rogers testified is not suppressed, tl"
Trial Court should be instructed to require, as a minimum, that tl"
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State establish Mr. Roger's qualifications to identify that specific
odor.
E.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REASONABLE
DOUBT," AS READ TO THE JURY, MISSTATES THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A
CRIMINAL TRIAL.
In State v. McCune, 51 P. 818

(Utah 1898) the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
A reasonable doubt is not a a mere imaginary, cautious, or
possible doubt, but a fair doubt, based upon reason and
common sense, and growing out of the testimony in the
case. It is such a doubt as will leave the juror's mind,
after a careful examination of all the evidence, in such a
condition that he cannot say that he has an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the Defendant's
guilt. 51 P. 818 at 819
In State v. Williamson, 62 P. 1022 (Utah 1900) the Utah Supreme
Court cited the above

language

in the McCune

case as a "very

satisfactory and comprehensive definition of reasonable doubt."
P. 1022 at 1024).

(62

The Court, in the Williamson case, was called

upon to decide whether an instruction on reasonable doubt violated
the Defendant's right to a fair trial.
following instruction:

The Court considered the

"[Reasonable doubt] means such a doubt as

would cause a prudent man to pause and hesitate before accepting as
true and acting upon any matter alleged and charged in the graver
and important affairs of life."
the

Court

acknowledged

that

In commenting on that instruction
while

the

instruction

concerning

reasonable doubt, taken as a whole, was correct, that portion quoted
had been criticized.

The Court then went on to state:

"It is not

advisable to enlarge upon or enter

into details

in giving the

definition

doubt

fluctuation

of

reasonable

doubt.

uncertainty of the mind arising

A

is

a

or

from defect of knowledge or of
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evidence; and a doubt of the guilt of the accused party, honestl]
entertained from the evidence, is a reasonable doubt."

(62 P.102;

at 1024)
In State v. Neel, 65 P. 494

(Utah 1901) there is a slighi

variation of the definition of reasonable doubt set forth in McCun*
and Williamson.

In the Neel case the Court instructed the jury a*

follows:
By a reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based on reason,
and which is reasonable in view of all the evidence; and
if, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you
are not satisfied of the Defendant's guilt, you have a
reasonable
doubt;
but
if,
after
such
impartial
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can
truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the
Defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act
upon in more weighty and important matters relating to
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt* It must
be a real, substantial doubt, and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary.
It should come to the mind
spontaneously,
and
should
fairly,
naturally,
and
reasonably arise out of the evidence as given in the case.
65 P. 494 at 495.
This definition of reasonable doubt substantially conforms t<
the McCune and Williamson definitions.

However, the Court went o;

to acknowledge that:
It is very probable that the part of the instruction as
given by the Court defining a reasonable doubt as being
'such as you would be willing to act upon the more weighty
and important affairs relating to your own affairs' would,
if standing alone, have been of questionable sufficiency,
yet, whether correct or not, it could do no harm with the
aid of, and in connection with, other parts of that and
other instructions given on that subject. 65 P. 494 at
495
The Supreme Court concluded its statement concerning reasonabl
doubt

by

commenting

that

persons
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capable

of

being

jurors

ar

supposed to know what a reasonable doubt is without an analytical
explanation.

Jurors

axe presumed

understand the English language.

to have

common

sense

and

to

If a juror cannot understand his

or her duty when instructed that they should not convict when they
have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner1 s guilt, they will "seldom
get

any

assistance

from

such

classical mind to distinguish."

subtleties

as

require

a

trained

(65 P. 494 at 495)

The McCune reasonable doubt instruction has been quoted with
approval by the Utah Supreme Court as recently as 1977 in the case
of State v. Brooks, 563 P2d. 799 (Utah 1977).
The instruction submitted by defense counsel but rejected by
the Trial Court is the instruction on reasonable doubt approved by
the Utah Supreme Court in the Neel case.
The instruction proposed by defense counsel complies with the
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and would have been appropriate
under the circumstances.
Despite defense counsel's request, the Trial Court instructed
the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt as follows:
15.
Before you give up your presumption that the
Defendant is innocent, you must make sure you are strongly
convinced he did the acts he is accused of, and that you
do not have a reasonable doubt about it.
16. A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would
stop a person with common sense from making an important
decision in his or her own life.
Notice when I say you should be strongly convinced
and not have a reasonable doubt, I am not saying you have
to be 100% certain. Use your common sense about this.
Nothing in life is absolutely certain. However, this
doesn't stop us from making important decisions in our own
lives. All we can ask of you is to be as certain as you
would want to be if you were making an important decision
in your own life.
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The Circuit Court instructed the jury that they need only be
"strongly convinced" and less than "100% certain."

These phrases ii

the charge to the jury require reversal for two reasons:

1) The

Court misstated the law and 2) the Court's instruction would lead c
jury to believe that they could convict if less than 100% certaii
that the Defendant were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The minimum level of proof required to convict in a criminal
case is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (UCA § 76-1-501(1)).

The

Court's charge instructed the jury that something less than 100certainty that that threshold had been met would suffice.

Thai

implies that something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubi
would warrant conviction; that is not the law.
The Supreme Court has approved the term "abiding conviction tc
a moral certainty of the Defendant's guilt" as the equivalent o:
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (51 P. 818 at 819)

An "abidin<

conviction" is something far different than "strongly convinced.
"Strongly

convinced"

implies

that

"convinced"

is measured

on

continuum and that "strongly," wherever that lies on the continuum
is sufficient to convict.

However, "convince" means:

"to overcome or subdue, and, in logic, to satisfy the mind
by proof. If evidence is convincing, in any case, it is
sufficient, and to say it ought to be more convincing [or
less] in one case than in another, is giving the word
degrees of comparison which it does not possess, the word
itself being the superlative" Ballentine's Law Dictionary,
Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, California 1969 at
page 270.
"Strongly
"convinced"

and

convinced"
has

never

is

something

been

approved

entirely
in

this

different
State

tha

as th

standard by which a jury is to judge the guilt or innocence of
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person.

Either the jury has a reasonable doubt or not.

"strongly

convinced"

has

no

place

in

a

jury

The term

instruction

on

reasonable doubt.
The

Supreme

Court

of

the

State

of

Utah

has

specifically

approved the term "to a moral certainty" as the equivalent of beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Less than 100% certain is not the same.

The

instruction of the Circuit Court would lead the jury to believe that
something less than moral certainty will do.

The Court erred in

giving that instruction to the jury.
Finally, the Court incorrectly instructed the jury that they
need be only so certain as they would want to be if making "an
important decision"

in the

juror's own

important affairs of life" and

life.

The

terms

"more

"matters of highest concern and

importance" and "most important interests" have all been approved
when used in the context of defining reasonable doubt, (75 AmJur 2d.
Trials § 835 at 728) , and the phrase "more weighty and important
matters" was permitted with reservations in State v. Neel,

(65 P.

494 at 495) . The term "an important decision in your own life" has
not.

In fact, the term "important transactions of life" has been

specifically disapproved by Courts in ether jurisdictions. (75 AmJur
2d. Trials § 835 at 727, 728)
The instruction proposed by defense counsel correctly states
the law in the State of Utah concerning the term "reasonable doubt."
The instruction provided by the Circuit Court contradicts prior
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court which couch proof beyond a
reasonable

doubt

in

terms

of

"abiding
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conviction"

and

"moral

certainty."

By telling the jury that they need only be "strongl

convinced" and that they need not be "1CC% certain" the Court mislei
the jury as to their duty in this criminal case.

The convictio

which

fair

followed

violated

Defendant's

right

to

a

trial

a

provided by law and to due process of lav; as guaranteed by the Fift
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution an
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Pegardless
Federal

of whether

Constitutional

this Court

grounds

or

decides

adopts

this

an

issue unde

independent

Stat

Constitutional basis for reviewing the reasonableness of automobil
inventory

searches,

unreasonable.

the

inventory

search

in

this

case

wa

The officer's unbridled discretion to open and searc

the contents of some containers and list other containers as sue
without inventorying their contents renders the inventory search pe
se

unreasonable.

The

Appellant's

conviction

for

possession

o

marijuana should be reversed, the evidence which foirmed the basi
for that conviction having been the result of an unreasonable searc
and

seizure

in

violation

of

Appellant's

Federal

and

Stat

Constitutional rights.
In the event the

items

seized

in the

inventory

search c

the vehicle which Appellant was driving are not suppressed, the
this case should, at the very least, be remanded for a new trie
with instructions to the Trial Court to require adequate foundatic
prior to allowing the testimony of either an expert or a lay perse
identifying the odor emanating from the "pipe" or "bong" offered a
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exhibits at trial.

This Court should additionally require that the

State introduce evidence relating Appellant's statements concerning
the amount of alcohol consumed to the issues before the Trier of
Fact

as

a

prerequisite

to

the

introduction

of

any

evidence,

including statements by the Appellant, as to the precise amount of
alcohol

consumed.

Finally,

this

Court

should

remand,

with

instructions to the Trial Court, to properly instruct the jury on
the issue of reasonable doubt.

The jury in a criminal case must be

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.

Anything less than that denies

a criminal defendant due process of law.

DATED this

'/^

day of

[Lp ^

, 1987.

GALLIAN & WESTFALL
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copy
foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid this
, 1987, to Counsel for Respondent, to witf;
to*
Paul F. Graf
Washington County Attorney
220 North 200 East
St. George, UT 84770
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of the
day *2^
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ADDENDUM
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of laws.
Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of lav;.
Section 14.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

M25/1/42

Utah Code Annotated §76-1-501,
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to b<
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him i,
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, th(
defendant shall be acquitted.

M25/1/42

Instruction No. 14
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRYING TO CONVINCE THE JURY THAT THE
DEFENDANT DID THE ACTS HE (OR SHE) IS ACCUSED OF?
Because the state (or city) is the party making the
accusations in this case, it has the responsibility to try to
persuade the jury that the defendant is guilty.
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty. Therefore, the defendant or
his (her) lawyer do not have to try to convince you the
defendant is innocent. You must start by presuming it.
Instruction No. 15
HOW CONVINCED SHOULD THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE DEFENDANT
IS GUILTY?
Before you give up your presumption the defendant is
innocent, you must make sure you are strongly convinced he did
the acts he is accused of, and that you do not have a
reasonable doubt about it.
Instruction No. 16
WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT?
A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would stop
a person with common sense from making an important decision
in his or her own life.
Notice when I say you should be strongly convinced and
not have a reasonable doubt, I am not saying you have to be
100% certain. Use your common sense about this. Nothing in
life is absolutely certain. However, this doesn't stop us
from making important decisions in our own lives. All we can
ask of you is to be as certain as you would want to be if you
were making an important decision in your own life.
(Testimony from witnesses is presented)
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INSTRUCTION NO.
By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based on reason, and which
is reasonble in view of all the evidence; and if, after an impartial
consideration and comparison of all the evidence in the* case, you
can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the Defendant's
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if, after such impartial
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully
say that you have an abiding conviction of the Defendant's guilt,
such as you would be willing to act upon in more weighty and
important ....matters
reasonable doubt.

relating

to

your

own

affairs, you

have

no

It must be a real, substantial doubt, and not one

that is merely possible or imaginary.

It should come to the mind

spontaneously, and should fairly, naturally, and reasonably arise
out of the evidence as given in the case.

